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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus directing the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to r emand punitive 
damages claims for trial together with the r emainder of 
personal injury claims arising from asbestos exposure. We 
will deny the petition for mandamus. 
 
Petitioners are four individuals seeking damages for 
injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. Pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1407(a) the claims were transferred by the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to Multidistrict 
Litigation No. 875, which is pending in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 
At the suggestion of the transferee judge, when the 
Judicial Panel remanded the petitioners' claims to the 
transferor courts, it withheld remand on the requests for 
punitive damages. This action was consistent with the 
transferee court's practice in multidistrict litigation 
asbestos cases over the past decade of retaining demands 
for punitive damages while allowing the compensatory 
matters to proceed to trial. The practice has been noted by 
this Court before. See In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 
n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The [transfer ee] court also has a 
practice when it does remand cases of severing and 
retaining jurisdiction over punitive damages claims."); Dunn 
v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1400 n.13 (W eis, J., dissenting). 
 
Petitioners contend that in "undertak[ing] the substantive 
task of preserving the assets available to satisfy asbestos 
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claims by refusing to remand the punitive damages issue," 
the Panel is overstepping its authority. They ar gue section 
1407(a) only permits the Panel to separate"claims," but 
requests for punitive damages do not have the 
characteristics of independent claims because a party 
cannot bring an action for such awards in isolation. On 
that basis, petitioners assert that the law tr eats punitive 
damages as a form of relief, not a claim or cause of action. 
 
Respondents point out that claims for punitive damages, 
although dependent on factors justifying compensatory 
awards, require separate elements of proof such as malice, 
fraud, or gross negligence. Moreover , respondents observe 
that many courts require or permit evidence of a 
defendant's wealth, a factor not generally per mitted when 
only compensation is sought. Because such evidence is 
necessary in order for a jury to assess punitive damages, 
but irrelevant to the merits of other claims, many 
jurisdictions also require that the punitive damages counts 
be tried separately from proceedings that determine 
compensatory awards. 
 
Section 1407(a) provides that "civil actions involving one 
or more common questions of fact . . . may be transferred 
[by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation] to any 
district for coordinated or consolidated pr etrial 
proceedings." 28 U.S.C. S 1407(a). At or before conclusion 
of the pretrial procedures, the Panel is to remand those 
cases to the districts from which they wer e originally 
transferred, "[p]rovided, however, That the panel may 
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter -claim, or third- 
party claim and remand any of such claims befor e the 
remainder of the action is remanded." Id. 
 
Essentially, the petitioners would have us construe 
"claim" in section 1407(a) to be synonymous with "cause of 
action," and a request for punitive damages to be merely an 
"issue" as that term is used in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 42(b). We reject these contentions. As a term of 
art and in common parlance, the meaning of "claim" is not 
so circumscribed. For example, a cause of action based 
upon negligence frequently is described as including 
"claims" for property damage, lost wages, medical bills, and 
pain and suffering. Neither the statute's language nor the 
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snippets of legislative history cited to us pr ovides a basis 
for adopting the petitioners' crabbed reading of the word. 
Rather, the legislative history of section 1407 demonstrates 
"that Congress intended transferee courts to have broad 
pretrial authority." Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 144. In our 
view, the Panel's expansive interpretation of"claim" is the 
more reasonable one and that which we endorse. 
 
Furthermore, although a demand for punitive damages 
does not stand alone, it is not simply a component of a 
claim inseparable from the whole. This distinctiveness is 
demonstrated by case law allowing new trials devoted solely 
to determining punitive damages. See, e.g. , Denesha v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc., 161 F.3d 491, 505 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Jannotta v. Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., 125 F .3d 503, 
517 (7th Cir. 1997). Separate trials of punitive damages 
claims are also permitted. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 
782 F.2d 468, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1986). A request for punitive 
damages is similar to a derivative claim, such as for loss of 
consortium, and may properly be characterized as "a 
separate but dependent claim for relief " that must be 
supported by independent allegations and proof. 1 James 
D. Ghiardi, et al., Punitive Damages L. & Prac., S 12.07 at 
22-23, 25 (1999). 
 
In addition, the statute grants unusually br oad discretion 
to the Panel to carry out its assigned functions. Subsection 
(e) provides that "[n]o proceedings for review of any order of 
the panel may be permitted except by extraor dinary writ 
pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section 1651, United 
States Code." This vehicle that Congress chose for review is 
one that we have held should only be granted "in response 
to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of power." 
Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 140. Petitioners have the burden to 
establish that they "have no other adequate means to attain 
the desired relief, and . . . that [their] right to the writ is 
clear and indisputable . . . . Even when these r equirements 
are met, issuance of the writ is largely discretionary." Id. at 
141. In this way, Congress granted substantial authority to 
the Panel to decide how the cases under its jurisdiction 
should be coordinated. It is significant that section 1407(a) 
directs that the Panel act "for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses and . . . promote the just and efficient 
conduct of such [civil] actions." 
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An even more compelling reason to adopt the Panel's 
interpretation is the public policy underlying the practice of 
severing punitive damages claims. In Patenaude , we quoted 
the transferee court's objectives in resolving the thousands 
of cases assigned to it -- "that the sick and dying, their 
widows and survivors should have their claims addr essed 
first." Id. at 139. The Report of the Judicial Conference Ad 
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation accurately appraised 
the problem: 
 
       "Although there may be grounds to support an award, 
       multiple judgments for punitive damages in the mass 
       tort context against a finite number of defendants with 
       limited assets threaten fair compensation to pending 
       claimants and future claimants who await their 
       recovery, and threaten the economic viability of the 
       defendants. To the extent that some states do not [sic] 
       permit punitive damages, such awards can be viewed 
       as a malapportionment of a limited fund. Meritorious 
       claims may go uncompensated while earlier claimants 
       enjoy a windfall unrelated to their actual damages." 
 
Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on 
Asbestos Litigation at 32 (March 1991). 
 
Punitive damages are a windfall to the r ecipients over 
and above compensatory damages to which they ar e 
entitled. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, punitive damages 
are paid in part to the state rather than the individual 
plaintiff. See Alaska Stat. S 9.17.020(j); Ga. Code Ann. S 51- 
12-5.1(e)(2) (product liability cases); Utah Code Ann. S 78- 
18-1(3). 
 
The resources available to persons injur ed by asbestos 
are steadily being depleted. The continuingfilings of 
bankruptcy by asbestos defendants disclose that the 
process is accelerating. It is responsible public policy to 
give priority to compensatory claims over exemplary 
punitive damage windfalls; this prudent conservation more 
than vindicates the Panel's decision to withhold punitive 
damage claims on remand. It is discouraging that while the 
Panel and transferee court follow this enlightened practice, 
some state courts allow punitive damages in asbestos 
cases. The continued hemorrhaging of available funds 
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deprives current and future victims of rightful 
compensation. 
 
Petitioners have failed to persuade us that the Panel 
ruling was erroneous. The petition does not demonstrate 
the extraordinary circumstances per mitting us to issue a 
writ of mandamus, much less compel us to exer cise our 
discretion and grant the request. 
 
The petition for mandamus will be denied. 
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